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Evaluation of systemic risk in networks of financial institutions in general requires information
of inter-institution financial exposures. In the framework of Debt Rank algorithm, we introduce
an approximate method of systemic risk evaluation which requires only node properties, such as
total assets and liabilities, as inputs. We demonstrate that this approximation captures a large
portion of systemic risk measured by Debt Rank. Furthermore, using Monte Carlo simulations, we
investigate network structures that can amplify systemic risk. Indeed, while no topology in general
sense is a priori more stable if the market is liquid [1], a larger complexity is detrimental for the
overall stability [2]. Here we find that the measure of scalar assortativity correlates well with level
of systemic risk. In particular, network structures with high systemic risk are scalar assortative,
meaning that risky banks are mostly exposed to other risky banks. Network structures with low
systemic risk are scalar disassortative, with interactions of risky banks with stable banks.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In the past, the stability of the banking sector was mostly analyzed considering measures of the individual banks.
Only recently, especially after the 2008 crisis, this has changed. Negative consequences of an interconnected economy
and especially of a interconnected financial sector were obvious to the whole world. Furthermore, scientists and policy
makers, that were concerned with systemic risk and financial system stability even before the crisis, recognized that
there was a serious lack of knowledge on the mechanisms how interconnectedness affects financial stability. For that
reason some new analyses including network effects and distress propagation were proposed [3–5].
Related research direction aimed at expanding the definition of financial system to multi-layer networks, including
different assets and valuations, different types of loans etc. [6, 7]. Applications of these models include central bank
regulation [3], individual assessment of systemic risk [8], simulations of different policies like for example bank taxation
[9, 10].
However, to compute these network risk measures, we need both computer simulations to sample the possible future
evolution of the system as well as a detailed knowledge of the interconnection network of institutions (for example
the investments between all pairs of banks [11]). This information about the network is (and just in a few cases)
only known to the regulating authorities, for that reason several methods of reconstructing the graph from partial
information have been proposed [12–16]. In order to determine the best possible reconstruction, a substantial research
analysis has been carried out [17].
Here we present a complementary approach to that of a reconstruction, by showing that a series of risk measures
(including network effects) can be understood to a great extent by analyzing the properties of single banks. Indeed
the presence of network is taken into account by the choices that managers realize for their institution, as a result
close inspection of local (single bank and couple of banks) measures can reveal something about the whole system.
Firstly, single bank measures as the interbank leverage (ratio of total investments of a bank into other banks over
this banks equity) is enough to understand the first steps of stress propagation (that account for a large part of
total stress propagation). Secondly, the investments between pairs of highly leveraged banks are also increasing stress
propagation. We find that investment networks with high systemic risk are highly assortative with respect to single
bank risk, while networks with lowest systemic risk are disassortative [18].
We use data that are taken from the Italian electronic broker market e-MID (Market for Interbank Deposits) run
by e-MID S.p.A. “Societa` Interbancaria per l’Automazione” (SIA), Milan. The Italian electronic broker Market for
Interbank Deposit (e-MID) covers the entire overnight deposit market in Italy. The information about the parties
involved in a transaction allows us to perform risk propagation on real networks as well as a benchmark against which
we create artificial networks.
As mentioned before, there is a number of papers which study the risk propagation with Detbrank [3], both for
direct application to stress tests [19] and to realize a plausible scenario to understand systemic risk [20]. Here we
follow the approach presented in [11]. This approach simplifies DebtRank method in such a way that one can employ
linear algebra, while still preserving the conclusions obtained in other variants of DebtRank.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we reintroduce DebtRank algorithm as proposed in [11]. Second, we analyze
amplification mechanism of the method and rewrite the algorithm in such a way that single node, neighborhood (local),
and global contributions to the DebtRank are clearly separated. Third, we propose a Monte Carlo network creation
algorithm to test which network configurations are extremal (maximal or minimal) with respect to the DebtRank.
Fourth, we present a simple illustrative example, which is followed by empirical results computed from the real data
and analytically solvable examples. We finish with analysis of finite size and varying distributions effects on our
results presented in previous sections.
II. BACKGROUND: PROPAGATING SHOCKS WITH DEBTRANK
Assume N banks, each with equity Ei. For every bank i, we additionally know, how much it invested in total into
other banks. We call this the interbank assets Ai of bank i. Additionally we know the liabilities of each bank i to all
other banks, called Li. Initially (time t = 0) we assume no distress, and
∑
iAi(0) =
∑
i Li(0). For t=1, we assume
external distress on the banks h(1) . According to this distress, the assets Ai have reduced value, as the distressed
banks are more likely to bankrupt and therefore not to pay back their debt. On the other hand, liabilities do not
get reduced. Here we want to understand network effects of the positive feedback between reduced equity and asset
value. For this we follow the DebtRank scenario. More precisely, we are interested in small every-day shocks, where
no bank looses all its equity.
To compute the equity losses, let us assume for the moment we know not only the total amount Ai of assets of bank
i, but also in which banks j they invested, denoted with the asset matrix Aij(0). We have Ai(0) =
∑
j Aij(0) and
Lj(0) =
∑
iAij(0). Further we define the matrix Λ with elements Λij = Aij(0)/Ei(0), and the distress parameter hi
3describing the relative loss of equity of bank i, hi(t) = 1− Ei(t)/Ei(0). According to [11] we have
hi(t) = hi(1) +
∑
j
Λijhj(1) +
∑
j
(Λ2)ijhj(1) + · · ·+
∑
j
(Λt−1)ijhj(1). (1)
For a homogeneously distributed initial distress such that Ei(1) = (1 − ψ)Ei(0) with a small positive ψ from (1)
we have
hi(t)/ψ = 1 +
∑
j
Λij +
∑
j
(Λ2)ij + · · ·+
∑
j
(Λt−1)ij . (2)
In the remainder of the text we are primarily interested in the total relative systemic equity loss
H(t) =
∑
i
hi(t)Ei(0)/
∑
j
Ej(0) (3)
and especially in its asymptotic value limt→∞H(t) ≡ H∞.
III. AMPLIFICATION OF A SMALL SHOCK HITTING ALL BANKS
For a general vector of initial distress hi(1), the total relative systemic equity loss can be expressed as
H∞ =
∑
iEi(0)hi(1)∑
k Ek(0)
+
∑
i Li(0)hi(1)∑
k Ek(0)
+
1∑
k Ek(0)
∑
jl
Lj(0)Ajl(0)hl(1)
Ej(0)
+O(A3) . (4)
As described above, we are interested in a small shock ψ hitting all banks equally, which roughly corresponds to
shocks at the macroeconomic level. Although this is necessarily an approximation, it allows us to obtain even more
detailed analytical insight into the total relative systemic equity loss using the data on individual banks (node specific
data). The macroeconomic multiplier Ψ = H∞/ψ describes, how the external shock is amplified in the banking
system. We can rewrite
Ψ = 1 +
∑
iAi(0)∑
k Ek(0)
+
∑
iAi(0)Li(0)/Ei(0)∑
k Ek(0)
+
∑
ij Aij(0)Li(0)Aj(0)/(Ei(0)Ej(0))∑
k Ek(0)
+ Ψ(res) (5)
≡ 1 + Ψ(1) + Ψ(2) + Ψ(3) + Ψ(res). (6)
Notice that the terms up to Ψ(2) only depend on the asset and liability sums Ai and Li. The term Ψ
(3) is the lowest
order term including the investment matrix Aij(0). Defining a risk matrix
R
(3)
ij = Li(0)Aj(0)/(Ei(0)Ej(0))× (1− δij), (7)
Ψ(3) can be written in a more compact way. With dimensionless quantities this reads
αij = Aij(0)/
∑
k
Ek(0), ai = Ai(0)/
∑
k
Ek(0), li = Li(0)/
∑
k
Ek(0), ei = Ei(0)/
∑
k
Ek(0) (8)
Ψ(3) =
∑
ij
αijR
(3)
ij , Ψ
(res) =
∞∑
t=4
∑
ij Ei(0)(Λ
t)ij∑
k Ek(0)
=
∞∑
t=4
∑
ij
ei(Λ
t)ij , Λij = Aij(0)/Ei(0) = αij/ei. (9)
If the eigenvalue of the matrix Λij with the largest absolute value, in the following called λ, has the absolute value
considerably smaller then one, we can expect the residual term to be a minor correction in Ψ. If, on the other hand,
λ ≥ 1, the equity loss accelerates infinitely and at least one bank bankrupts.
Finally, for t→∞ the relation (1) can be written at the matrix level as
h(1) = (I − Λ)h∞ . (10)
From the condition that all elements of h∞ are below 1, corresponding to no bankruptcies in the system, it is possible
to obtain conditions on initial distress. This result directly reflects the fact that, owing to the network structure
encoded in Λ, the stability of the entire financial network has different sensitivity on the same level of initial distress
4at various nodes. This information may be of practical importance to financial regulators. In particular, if some hi(1)
is outside allowed range obtained by (10), regulators should consider intervention, possibly in the form of restructuring
the financial network. The practical calculation of h(1) using analytical methods might be prohibitively complicated
even for networks of moderate size. A more convenient approach is based on simulations. One can randomly select
each component of h∞ in the interval of values corresponding to no bankruptcy (0 ≤ h∞i < 1) and calculate h(1)
using (10). With a sufficiently large number of such calculations one can obtain estimates of no-bankruptcy intervals
for all components of h(1). This analysis is left for future work.
IV. MINIMAL AND MAXIMAL SHOCK AMPLIFICATION Ψ
For understanding the bounds of systemic risk in measures of the shock multiplier Ψ, let us minimize or maximize
Ψ(αij) by varying αij , given single bank properties Ai(0), Li(0) and Ei(0). We use a stochastic optimization process.
For variables αij we have constraints∑
j
αij = ai,
∑
i
αij = lj , αij ≥ 0, αii = 0. (11)
We want to maximize a more general nonlinear function F (αij) (F will be replaced with ±Ψ and possible additional
terms). If we once have a valid matrix αij fulfilling all constraints, we can add to it a matrix
D(i1, j1, i2, j2)ij = dδi,i1δj,j1 + dδi,i2δj,j2 − dδi,i1δj,j2 − dδi,i2δj,j1 , (12)
D(0, 1, 2, 3) =

0 d 0 −d 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 −d 0 d 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
 . (13)
The example is for N = 5. To find an initial valid matrix αij , we can start with α˜ij = ailj/
∑
k ak. We successively
subtract matrices of the form D(i1, i1, i2, i2), until only one diagonal element is left, and further D(i1, i1, i2, j2 6= i2)
to eliminate the last diagonal element as well. For finding matrices αij with extremal F (αij), we propose updates
α→ α+D(i1, j1, i2, j2), with D involving only off-diagonal elements. If for the updated matrix it would hold αij ≥ 0,
we accept updates with probability
min{1, exp{β[F (α+D)− F (α)]}}. (14)
For F = Ψ, Ψ is maximized, while for F = −Ψ it is minimized. The positive parameter β regulates, how likely
updates away from the optimization goal are accepted. For large β, such updates are accepted very unlikely. Small
β can be used to escape local extrema (often combined with an increasing parameter β over time, to approach the
global extreme in the end of the optimization procedure). In order to force additional constraints for the investment
matrix αij , we add further terms
F = ±Ψ− βkk¯(αij)− βasym
∑
ij αijαji∑
ij α
2
ij
. (15)
For βk > 0, αij is more sparse after optimization. The average degree is calculated as k¯ = k¯in = k¯out =
∑
ij Θ(αij)/N ,
with theta function Θ(x > 0) = 1 and Θ(0) = 0. With βasym > 0, the investment-matrix is forced to be asymmetric.
This has the following meaning: If for a pair of banks i, j it holds αijαji > 0, bank i invests into bank j, while at the
same time bank j invests into bank i. In the e-MID data there is a number of closed loops of length 2, but for the
purposes of this paper we chose to suppress them. The reason for this choice is that in overnight market one can easily
clear the debt between two parties, and we choose the DebtRank version presented in [11] which does not provide
stop in iterations of the DebtRank algorithm. Short loops therefore iterate shock propagation between 2 banks ad
infinitum and the correct way to alleviate this problem is to ”clear”them into a one directional edge whose weight is
the difference between the values of two reciprocal edges.
A. Illustrative example
For illustration, let us first discuss an artificial example of a network of interbank liabilities. We use a small
network with N = 30 banks, equities from a Pareto distribution with exponent three, and interbank leverages
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FIG. 1. (a) In the upper panel, the shock multiplier Ψ is shown during maximization (red line) and minimization (green line),
where n denotes sweeps (with N2 update trials). This is for an artificial example with N = 30 banks, equities from a Pareto
distribution with exponent three, and interbank leverages 0.32 < Ai/Ei = Li/Ei < 0.96 from a uniform distribution. In the
lower panel, a scalar assortativity measure with respect to interbank leverage is shown for the same optimization runs. Minimal
systemic risk is connected to dissassortative networks (see also (b)), while maximal systemic risk is connected to assortative
networks (see also (c)). The networks in (b) and (c) encode the total assets Ai of a bank i as node size, and the interbank
leverage Ai/Ei as node color from green (low values) to red (high values).
0.32 < Ai/Ei < 0.96 from a uniform distribution. As it is easiest to illustrate and understand the case with Ai = Li,
we start with this case. For optimization, we use parameters β = 106, βk = 0.1 and βasym = 2.0. We sum up the
first 50 terms of Ψ for assessing update trials, and once a sweep we calculate Ψ using the first 200 terms, with results
plotted on the upper panel of fig. 1a. The final optimized networks have average degree k¯ = 2.0 (minimization)
and k¯ = 2.6 (maximization). Largest eigenvalues are λ = 0.67 (minimization) and λ = 0.83 (maximization). Both
connection matrices are strictly asymmetric at the end of optimization. On the lower panel of (a), we see a scalar
assortativity measure with respect to interbank leverage Ai/Ei. Correlations among nodes with a scalar property can
be described with the assortativity measure r = [
∑
xy xy(exy−axby)]/σaσb [18]. Here exy is the fraction of links from
a vertex of type x to a vertex of type y, and node types are assigned with choosing intervals for Ai/Ei. Further, we
have ax =
∑
y exy and by =
∑
x exy. We used an implementation provided with graph-tool [21], where the variance
is obtained with the jackknife method. For small systemic risk, highly leveraged banks should both lend from and
borrow to banks with small leverage. This is the case for the network with minimized Ψ shown in (b). If highly
leveraged banks lend among each other, systemic risk is high, as can be seen in (c).
B. Empirical results
We use an interbank liability data-set for the European market involving Italian banks in the year 1999. For a
shock in the night before the last trading day in July, Friday July 30. 1999, we consider all outstanding liabilities
with lifetime at least the next five trading days. These contracts thus have to be repaid earliest the upcoming Friday
after one week. This choice is to guarantee that shock propagation due to devaluation of contracts has time to take
place, what is in question for overnight obligations. Possible contract durations are thus starting from two weeks,
up to one year. We construct the network of all 218 involved banks, and reduce it to the largest strongly connected
component, including N = 53 banks. As the data-set is anonymized, we have to reconstruct the equity of the banks.
We choose Ei = max(Ai, Li) × 1.25 × ξi with ξi from a normal distribution with mean one and standard deviation
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FIG. 2. (a) Liability network with N = 53 banks in the Italian market in 1999. (d) For this network, source and target
properties are uncorrelated. (e) After minimizing systemic risk, the network becomes disassortative, with anti-correlations
among different scalar properties for source and target node. For Ai = Li, these correlations can be described with the simpler
measure of scalar disassortativity as shown in fig. 1a on the bottom. The gray band indicates area between first and third
quartile for Ai/Ei, so half of values Ai/Ei around the median lies within the gray area. We see that for small systemic risk, a
bank i with high Li/Ei should lend to a bank j with low Aj/Ej . Interpretation: A bank i with high Li/Ei has high impact
on its lenders, while a bank j with low Aj/Ej has only small exposure to its borrowers, thus shocks are dampened. (b) The
network with minimal risk. Total assets Ai of a bank i shown as node size, and the interbank Li/Ei as edge color at the edge
source, Aj/Ej at edge target, color from green (low values) to red (high values). (c) Network with maximal risk. (f) Maximal
systemic risk is connected to assortativity.
0.2. The resulting network can be seen in fig. 2a. Total assets Ai of a bank i shown as node size, and the interbank
Li/Ei as edge color at the edge source, Aj/Ej at edge target, color from green (low values) to red (high values). We
found a shock amplifier Ψ = 1.90 for this network. In (d) we analyze for this network correlations between lenders
liabilities divided by equity (source Li/Ei) and borrowers leverage (target Ai/Ei). The average Ai/Ei of all target
nodes is plotted which are reached from source nodes with values Li/Ei from a certain interval. We see that there are
no significant correlations between lenders liabilities divided by equities and borrowers leverage. For Ai = Li, these
correlations simplify and can be described with the scalar assortativity as shown in fig. 1a on the bottom.
The network consists of 763 edges among the 53 banks, therefore the average degree is 14.4. Assets Ai and liabilities
Li are mildly correlated with a pearson correlation of 0.11. In total 36 of the directed edges have a counter part in
the opposite direction, so some loops of length two are present. The largest Ai is 875 million Euros, the largest Li
is 1132 million Euros. All assets sum up to 7.04 billion Euros, so do the liabilities. Using 100 different samples of
equities Ei we found 〈Ψ〉 = 1.87 with standard deviation 0.06.
As for the illustrative example, we minimize and maximize the shock amplifier Ψ with final sweep n = 104, β = 106,
βk = 0.1 and βasym = 2.0. We sum up the first 50 terms of Ψ for assessing update trials. After the final sweep
we calculate Ψ using the first 200 terms, with results Ψ = 1.80 (minimization) and Ψ = 2.25 (maximization). The
7final optimized networks both have average degree k¯ = 2.0. The connection matrix minimizing shock amplification is
strictly asymmetric at the end of optimization, while for maximization we see a small number of loops of length two.
Results are shown in fig. 2. With (b) and (e) we see that an investment matrix with minimized Ψ has a more subtle
kind of scalar disassortativity, as compared to the illustrative example with Ai/Ei = Li/Ei. Here, systemic risk is
minimized, when banks with high Li/Ei lend to banks with low Ai/Ei. With (c) and (f), we see that the network
of the maximized systemic risk is assortative. It is important to stress that this structure is very different from the
typical core-periphery structure usually observed in financial networks [22, 23]. It is also important to stress that
risk minimization in principle reduces the number of edges in the network, therefore reducing the risk diversification
of single financial institution. The apparent paradox was previously addressed in [24]. We also have to stress that
scalar assortativity is very different from network assortativity. Previous analysis of cascades in complex networks
[25], showed that cascades are (analogous to systemic risk spreading) inhibited by network assortative structures,
while this analysis shows that systemic risk is amplified with scalar assortativity. This results are not opposed to each
other but are complementary to each other.
C. Analytically solvable examples
There is another strong indicator, why correlations between source Li/Ei and target Aj/Ej are dominating in the
optimization: For constant C = Li/Ei or constant C = Ai/Ei (e.g. no positive or negative correlations possible), Ψ
is constant, independent of the investment matrix Aij . Let us first show this for C = Ai/Ei. The terms up to Ψ
(2)
are anyhow independent of Aij . For higher terms we can write Ψ
(3) + Ψ(res) =
∑∞
t=3
∑
ij ei(Λ
t)ij . We can define a
stochastic matrix with elements Sij = Aij/EiC, as Ai/Ei =
∑
j Aij/Ei = C. With
∑
j Sij = 1 and Λij = SijC, we
have
Ψ(3) + Ψ(res) =
∞∑
t=3
∑
ij
eiC
t(St)ij =
∞∑
t=3
Ct
∑
i
ei =
∞∑
t=3
Ct. (16)
Here we use properties of stochastic matrices,
∑
j(S
2)ij =
∑
jk SikSkj = 1 etc. For liability sums being constant
C = Li/Ei, we can define a stochastic matrix Sij = Aij/EjC, here with
∑
i Sij = 1. We have Λij = SijCEj/Ei,
and
∑
ijklEiΛijΛjkΛkl = C
3
∑
ijkl SijSjkSklEl = C
3
∑
lEl, with the same result Ψ
(3) = C3 as for constant leverage.
The same holds for higher terms. With this finding, other more subtle properties of the investment matrix, as second
neighbor correlations, can only play a limited role. Further, we found an approximation for banks with interbank
leverage from a sharply peaked distribution (maxi|Ai/Ei − 〈Aj/Ej〉j |  〈Ai/Ei〉i). In this case, the macroscopic
shock amplification is mostly independent of the investment network and a simple function of the average leverage
Ψ ≈∑∞t=0(〈Ai/Ei〉i)t = 1/(1− 〈Ai/Ei〉i), with geometric sum only for 〈Ai/Ei〉i < 1.
Let us now discuss a case, where the optimization of Ψ can be performed explicitly. We have N = n1 + n2
banks with identical equity Ei = E, ei = 1/N . With this choice, we have Λij = Aij/E. The first n1 banks have
Ai/E = Li/E = c1, while the last n2 banks are less leveraged with Ai/E = Li/E = c2 < c1. Illustrated for n1 = 2
and n2 = 3, let us introduce the following parametrized matrix
Λ =

c1
n1
c1
n1
0 0 0
c1
n1
c1
n1
0 0 0
0 0 c2n2
c2
n2
c2
n2
0 0 c2n2
c2
n2
c2
n2
0 0 c2n2
c2
n2
c2
n2
+ κ

−n2n1 −n2n1 1 1 1−n2n1 −n2n1 1 1 1
1 1 −n1n2 −n1n2 −n1n2
1 1 −n1n2 −n1n2 −n1n2
1 1 −n1n2 −n1n2 −n1n2
 = Λa + κ∆. (17)
The matrix Λa is maximally assortative, as only banks of the same type interact. For a simpler notation, we allow
for self-links. The diagonal elements can easily be emptied into links among banks of the same type. This keeps Ψ
unchanged. With Λij ≥ 0, we have 0 ≤ κ ≤ min(c1/n2, c2/n1). For the maximal value of κ, the two bank types
interact as much as the constraints allow. Therefore, this is the maximally dissassortative case. The change in Ψ for
an infinitessimal increase of dissassortativity, going from Λ to Λ + dκ∆, is
dΨ =
∞∑
t=3
t−1∑
p=2
∑
ij
(Λp∆Λt−p)ijdκ/N, (18)∑
ij
(Λp∆Λt−p)ij = −f(Λp)f(Λt−p) with f(Λp) = n1(Λp)11 + (n2 − n1)(Λp)1N − n2(Λp)NN . (19)
8We neglect higher order terms in dκ and use the fact that
∑
i ∆ij = 0, such that this matrix only occurs in between
matrices Λ. With showing that
∑
ij(Λ
p∆Λt−p)ij ≤ 0 for all 0 < p < t, we show that the most assortative connection
matrix implies largest shock propagation, while the most dissassortative matrix implies smallest shock propagation.
We show that f(Λp) = f(Λ)Cp with Cp positive. Using (Λ
p)1N = n1Λ11(Λ
p−1)1N + n2Λ1N (Λp−1)NN and analog
expressions for (Λp)11 and (Λ
p)NN , we can write f(Λ
p) = n1(Λ
p−1)11f(Λ) + n2ΛNNf(Λp−1). This is a positive
multiple of f(Λ), if this holds for f(Λp−1). With the condition being trivially fulfilled for f(Λ1), we can use induction
to prove it for any p.
For Λ = Λass, the simple closed form result Ψ =
∑∞
t=0 c
t
1 + c
t
2 holds. The dominating term c
t
1 grows or shrinks
exponentially with t. The minimized Ψ is a lengthy polynomial in c1, c2, n1 and n2 which cannot be easily reduced
into a closed form expression. With an ansatz v = (1, 1, . . . , a, a, . . . ) for the eigenvector with largest eigenvalue λ, we
find
λ =
c1 − κn2 + c2 − κn1
2
+
{
[c1 − κn2 − (c2 − κn1)]2
4
+ κ2n1n2
}1/2
. (20)
Assume many healthy banks and a few highly leveraged banks: n1 = 5, c1 = 2, n2 = 50, c2 = 0.5. For Λa we have
λ = c1 = 2 with the first n1 banks going bankrupt. For largest possible κ, we have λ = 0.8. Here all banks survive
a small macroeconomic shock. In this latter case, the first n1 banks do not lend among each other, and the healthy
banks dedicate a share of 2/5 for interactions with the first n1 banks and remain a share of 3/5 for interactions among
each other.
D. Finite size effects and varying distributions of single bank properties
FIG. 3. Finite size effects for unrestricted optimization (circles) and restricted optimization, where small degree and asymmetric
investment-matrix is forced (diamonds). (a) With finite size scaling we find that for large N , Ψ after minimization approaches
Ψ∞min ≈ 2.0947± 5× 10−4, with a finite size deviation about ∝ N−1.15. Numerical results are shown with circles (unrestricted)
and diamonds (restricted optimization). The dashed line indicates a power law with exponent -1.15. (b) Results of (a) are
repeated with linear scale (green symbols and lower dashed line), and compared to results of maximization (red symbols
and upper dashed line indicating results of a finite size scaling). The dotted lines indicate Ψ∞min and Ψ
∞
max ≈ 2.315 ± 0.01.
(c) Assortativity after restricted optimization for minimization (green diamonds) and maximization (red diamonds). Results
indicate that, independent of the network size, least risky networks are strongly disassortative, while most risky networks are
strongly assortative with respect to leverage.
For discussing finite size effects with varying network size N , we choose Ei = 1 for all banks, and Ai/Ei =
Li/Ei = 0.2 + 0.6i/(N − 1). This way, single bank properties for networks of different size are similar, and there is
no need to average over many realizations of single bank properties. We optimize for nmax = 5 × 103 sweeps with
increasing parameter β = 10 ×N2 × 100n/nmax . The algorithmic cost per optimization sweep scales with N4, as for
every microscopic update trial, matrix multiplications have to be performed (scaling with N2), and there are N2
microscopic update trials in a sweep. With a choice of small values for leverage, we can use only the first 13 terms
in Ψ for assessing update trials. Final Ψ is calculated with 103 terms. Unrestricted optimization is performed with
9βk = βasym = 0, results with restrictions are found using βk = 0.1 and βasym = 2.0. In fig. 3a we see a finite size
scaling for unrestricted (green circles) and restricted (green diamonds) minimization. We found an asymptotic result
Ψ∞min ≈ 2.0947± 5× 10−4, and Ψ−Ψ∞min ∝ N−1.15. We also performed a finite size scaling for results of unrestricted
maximization of Ψ (not shown). This has less convincing results, indicating that local maxima are a problem. We
found Ψ∞max ≈ 2.315±0.01. In (b) we see results for minimization (green) and maximization (red). For small networks,
restricted maximization results (red diamonds) are far below the unrestricted case (red circles). However, deviations
are small for larger networks. In (c) we see that networks with maximized Ψ are strongly assortative, while networks
with minimized Ψ are strongly disassortative.
n
FIG. 4. Rescaling single bank leverage Ai/Ei → c × Ai/Ei, stress propagation can switch from dampened to exponentially
growing. We see this for an example case with c = 2. While the largest eigenvalue λ of the stress propagation matrix Λ increases
from below one (solid lines, minimization green, maximization red) to above one (dashed lines), the optimization procedure
has a similar outcome with respect to assortativity in both cases.
We already discussed, how correlations among single bank properties Ai/Ei and Li/Ei affect results. Let us now
discuss the outcome with rescaling Ai/Ei → c×Ai/Ei and Li/Ei → c× Li/Ei. We choose Ei = 1 for all banks, and
Ai/Ei = Li/Ei = c × (0.2 + 0.6i/(N − 1)), with N = 30 banks. In fig. 4 we see results for c = 1 (solid lines) and
c = 2 (dashed lines). We optimize for nmax = 5 × 103 sweeps with increasing parameter β = 10 × N2 × 100n/nmax .
As the losses grow exponentially for c = 2, we only use the first 6 terms in Ψ for assessing update trials. On the
left of the figure, we see the largest eigenvalue λ of the stress propagation matrix Λ during optimization. λ is larger
then one for c = 2 (dashed lines). This means that even a very small initial shock causes an exponentially growing
stress propagation, finally causing at least one bankrupt bank. On the right of the figure, we see that monitoring
assortativity while optimization indicates a similar behavior, even if stress propagation changes from dampened (solid
lines) to exponentially growing (dashed lines).
V. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We saw that in the framework of DebtRank, most risky investment networks are highly assortative with respect
to lenders liabilities divided by equity (source Li/Ei) and borrowers leverage (target Ai/Ei). We tested this for
artificial samples of single bank properties, finding that the effect is robust regarding to correlations among single
bank properties, network size and finally, it is also a common feature of dampened or exponentially growing stress
propagation. Also for empirical data we found this behavior. Finally we performed the optimization analytically for
a network with two types of banks.
Two main results of this paper are: (i) shock propagation in financial networks can be approximately calculated
from single node properties only and (ii) this shock propagation can be minimized by making financial networks
disassortative. Besides an obvious advantage in (i) that the computation using single node properties only is simpler
and faster, there exist other advantages and potential applications of these results.
The possibility to (approximately) estimate shock amplification in interbank networks from single bank properties
brings additional advantage for financial regulators. Namely, single bank properties necessary for such estimation,
such as their total assets, Ai, and liabilities Li are cumulative quantities and, as such, they change more slowly
than changes in the structure of the interbank networks. In particular, on a daily basis, we do not expect total
assets or liabilities of the bank to change significantly. However, it is reasonable to expect that at the same daily
timescale any bank in the network would engage in lending to or borrowing from many new banks, or changing
amount of lending/borrowing for other banks that the said bank is already connected to. Thus, in the regime where
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the approximation of shock propagation is reliable using only first terms that depend on single bank properties, these
estimates are also expected to remain reliable for as long as these single bank properties do not change significantly,
and much longer than the typical scale on which the interbank network changes.
The association of scalar disassortative network structures with lower systemic risk, gives regulators more ”degrees
of freedom” in resolving situations where vulnerability of a small number of banks threatens the entire network.
Namely, there are many network structures with high disassortativity and it is easier for regulators to find or realize
one of them if realistic legal, liquidity or even political constraints exist.
An interesting parallel with physical systems also arises from this analysis. Namely, if we classify leverage in to
discreet categories, than we can possibly map them to spin systems like Potts model. If this analogy holds, one could
associate low risk structures with a variant of antiferro Potts model, while networks which exhibit more risk could
possibly be associated with ferro variant of Potts model. Weather this analogy holds is beyond the scope of this
paper, but if the mapping of systemic risk model to such a well studied statistical physics model would be obtained,
a community of scientists that study systemic risk could greatly benefit from accumulated knowledge.
Finally, the approach of estimating shock propagation in interbank networks from single bank properties only, pro-
vides a novel possibility for public oversight of financial system stability. As banks publish public financial statements
in regular intervals, and these statements contain data on total borrowing from or lending to other banks in the
financial system, it is in principle possible for anyone to compute the lower bound on the systemic risk for various
scenarios of initial financial distress. In this way, monitoring systemic risk in the financial system would no longer be
limited to regulatory authorities.
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